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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953). The Fifth Judicial District 
Court for Washington County, State of Utah, certified its Order of 
Formal Probate of Will, Construction of Will, and Denial of 
Petition for Declaration of Partial Intestacy as a final order, 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Petitioner/Appellant Ryan W. Scarritt lists nine separate 
"Issues for Review" in his brief on appeal. The Petitioner's 
"issues," however, merely provide a confused and repetitive summary 
of the Petitioner's arguments. Appellee Rodney K. Orton believes 
that the following statements better frame the issues presented for 
review: 
1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that 
Curtiss S. Scarritt died testate as to all of his real property, 
where the decedent's Last Will and Testament manifests a clear 
intent that his personal representative sell the real property and 
add the proceeds to the Testator's estate for use and distribution 
under the Will.1 
2. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that 
Curtiss S. Scarritt died testate as to all of his personal 
property, where the decedent's Last Will and Testament makes 
This issue encompasses Issues a, b, c, d, e, f, and h from 
Appellant's Brief. [Appellant's Brief, at 1-2.] 
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various devises of personal property and then expressly provides 
for distribution of "the remaining items of personal property."2 
SIGNIFICANT STATUTES 
The following statutes provide significant guidance in the 
determination of this appeal: 
(1) [The Utah Uniform Probate Code] shall 
be liberally construed and applied to promote 
its underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies 
of this code are: . . . (b) To discover and 
make effective the intent of a decedent in 
distribution of his property; . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 (1953). 
The intention of a testator as expressed 
in his will controls the legal effect of his 
dispositions. The rules of construction 
expressed in the succeeding sections of this 
part apply unless a contrary intention is 
indicated by the will. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-603 (1953). 
A will is construed to pass all property 
which the testator owns at his death including 
property acquired after the execution of the 
will. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953). 
"Property" includes both real and personal 
property or any interest therein and means 
anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(33) (Supp. 1991). 
"Personal property" includes every 
description of money, goods, chattels, 
effects, evidences of rights in action, and 
2This issue encompasses Issues a, b, d, and i. Issue g has 
never been an issue in this litigation. [Appellant's Brief, at 1-
2.] 
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all written instruments by which any pecuniary 
obligation, right, or title to property is 
created, acknowledged, transferred, increased, 
defeated, discharged, or diminished, and every 
right or interest therein• 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(m) (Supp. 1991). 
The common law of England so far as it is 
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the 
constitution of laws of the United States, or 
the constitution or laws of this state, and so 
far only as it is consistent with and adapted 
to the natural and physical conditions of this 
state and the necessities of the people 
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the 
rule of decision in all courts of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case comes before the Utah Supreme Court on appeal from 
formal testacy proceedings before the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in and for Washington County, State of Utah. The District 
Court rejected Ryan W. Scarritt's petition for a declaration that 
Curtiss S. Scarritt died partially intestate. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On July 10, 1991, the District Court entered an order 
informally probating the Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. 
Scarritt (the "Will") and appointing Appellee Rodney K. Orton to 
act as personal representative. [Order For Informal Appointment 
of Personal Representative, R. 41-42.] On July 12, 1991, Ryan W. 
Scarritt (the "Petitioner") filed a Petition for Formal Probate of 
Will, Construction of Will, Declaration of Partial Intestacy, and 
Supervised Administration (the "Petition"), claiming that Curtiss 
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S. Scarritt (the "Testator") died partially intestate and that 
Petitioner was one of the Testator's heirs. [R. 14-17.] 
On August 14, 1991, Appellee Rodney K. Orton (the "Personal 
Representative") filed objections to the Petition, maintaining that 
the Will disposed of all of the Testator's property, both real and 
personal, that the Petitioner had been intentionally omitted from 
the Will, and that the Petitioner therefore had no interest in the 
Testator's estate. [Response and Objections of Personal 
Representative to Petition for Formal Probate of Will, Construction 
of Will, Declaration of Partial Intestacy, and Supervised 
Administration, R. 94-99.] The Personal Representative also filed 
an affidavit executed by the attorney who drafted the Testator's 
Will, supporting the Personal Representative's construction of the 
Will. [Affidavit of James M. Park in Opposition to Petition of 
Ryan W. Scarritt, R. 83-87, a true and correct copy of which is 
included in the Addendum to this brief.] On August 22, 1991, the 
District Court heard oral arguments on the Petition. [Reporter's 
Hearing Transcript of August 22, 1991.] 
C. Disposition in the District Court. 
On September 5, 1991, the District Court issued a Memorandum 
Decision, holding that the Will effectively disposed of all of the 
Testator's real and personal property and that the Petitioner had 
no interest in the Testator's estate. [Memorandum Decision, R. 12-
19.] On September 25, 1991, the District Court entered its Order 
of Formal Probate of Will, Construction of Will, Imposition of 
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Supervised Administration and Denial of Petition for Declaration 
of Partial Intestacy (the "Order of Formal Probate"). [R. 29-
39. ] 
The District Court determined that the Testator intended his 
real property to be sold and the proceeds to be added to his estate 
for use in paying estate taxes and for distribution under the Will. 
[Order of Formal Probate, Findings, JJ 19-20, R. 32-33.] The 
District Court further determined that all of the Testator's 
personal property passed under the Will. [Order of Formal Probate, 
Conclusions, ff 7-14, R. 35-36.] The District Court concluded that 
the Testator's residual personal property, including the real 
property proceeds, passed under a provision of the Will disposing 
of "the remaining items of personal property." [Order of Formal 
Probate, Conclusions, JJ 10-11, 19, R. 35-36.] The District Court 
certified the Order of Formal Probate as a final, appealable order 
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [Order of 
Formal Probate, pp. 9-10, R. 37-38.] This appeal followed. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
The Testator died on June 5, 1991, owning certain real and 
personal property. [Order of Formal Probate, Findings, J J 1, 9, 
R. 3 0-31.] The only real property the Testator owned at his death 
was a ranch located near Virgin, Utah (the "Ranch"). [Order of 
Formal Probate, Findings, J 20, R. 3 3.] The Testator was unmarried 
at his death, but he was survived by two sons—Curtiss S. Scarritt, 
Jr., and the Petitioner. [Order of Formal Probate, Findings, JJ 
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10, 14, R. 31-32.] The Testator left a valid will. [Order of 
Formal Probate, Findings, JJ 5-7, R. 3 0.] 
The Testator's Will begins with a revocation of all prior 
wills and codicils and provides directions for disposition of the 
Testator's remains. [Will, Articles FIRST and SECOND.] The SECOND 
Article of the Will then directs payment of the Testator's debts: 
I hereby direct that all my just debts, 
funeral expenses, and expenses of my last 
illness be made as soon after my death as may 
reasonably be convenient; I hereby authorize 
and empower my Executor . . . to settle and 
discharge [all claims made against the 
estate]. 
The THIRD Article contains the main dispositive provisions of 
the Will. It begins with a broad statement regarding the 
Testator's estate: 
All the rest, residue, and remainder of 
my estate, both real and personal, of 
whatsoever kind and nature and wheresoever the 
same may be situated of which I shall die 
seized or possessed to which in any way I may 
be entitled at the time of my death, with the 
exception of the Horace S. Scarritt Trust . . 
. , I give, devise, and bequeath as follows: 
Subsection A of the THIRD Article devises certain Certificates of 
Deposit. Subsection B devises the sums in the "Ferguson Capital 
Account." Subsection C devises the Testator's "race horse and 
related livestock and vehicles." Subsection D devises "[a]11 other 
livestock and saddle horses." Subsection E.l. devises a sherry set 
and a shotgun to the Personal Representative. 
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Subsection E.2. of Article THIRD provides a mechanism for 
distribution of the "remaining items" of the Testator's "personal 
property:" 
The distribution of the remaining items of 
personal property should be determined by 
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton and 
James M. Park. 
The District Court found it "significant that the testator included 
in this committee two of his close personal friends and his son 
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr." [Order of Formal Probate, Findings, 5 
14, R. 31-32.] 
The FIFTH Article of the Will directs that all estate and 
other taxes "shall be paid out of or charged against my Utah estate 
. . . as if it were a debt and without apportionment." 
The SIXTH Article of the Will devises to the Testator's son, 
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., "all articles of personal, household or 
domestic use or adornment, . . . excluding only such articles of 
farm and ranch machinery and equipment, together with horses and 
other livestock, and such personal property as may be selected and 
distributed pursuant to the provisions of Article THIRD . . . ." 
The SEVENTH Article of the Will expresses the Testator's 
directions with respect to disposition of the Ranch and any 
"tangible personal property" not distributed in kind under previous 
provisions of the Will: 
I hereby direct my Personal 
Representative to borrow monies against my 
real property located in Virgin, Utah and to 
pay whatever sums are necessary for the 
maintenance, upkeep and preservation of my 
ranch in Virgin, Utah . . . . All monies 
borrowed against the real property in Virgin, 
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Utah are to be paid back immediately upon the 
sale of said property. I authorize my 
Personal Representative to sell all real 
property, together with all tangible personal 
property and livestock included in my estate 
and not effectively disposed of pursuant to 
Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof, at such time 
or times and upon such terms and conditions as 
shall seem advisable and to add the proceeds 
of any such sale to my estate. 
The NINTH Article of the Will expressly precludes the 
Petitioner from receiving any of the Testator's estate under the 
Will: 
I make no provision for my son, Ryan 
Winthrop Scarritt, for the reason that he will 
be well-provided for, following my death, 
under the will of my father, Horace S. 
Scarritt. 
8UMMARY OF THE PER80NAL REPRESENTATIVE'S ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly rejected the Petitioner's request 
for a declaration of partial intestacy, because the Will disposes 
of all of the Testator's real and personal property. The primary 
purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate Code is to "discover and make 
effective" the decedent's intent in the distribution of his or her 
property. The "paramount objective" in interpreting a will is, 
therefore, to give effect to the testator's intent. The testator's 
intent must be determined by considering all of the provisions of 
the will. One of the most significant canons of construction for 
determining the testator's intent is the statutory presumption that 
a testator intends to pass all of his or her property under the 
will and avoid intestacy. This presumption is so strong that this 
Court has stated that it will adopt "any reasonable construction 
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[of a will] to avoid a conclusion of intestacy." In light of this 
presumption, the Petitioner must establish that the only reasonable 
construction of the Testator's Will results in intestacy. 
Petitioner cannot prevail because there is a reasonable 
construction of the Will that disposes of all of the Testator's 
real and personal property. The SEVENTH Article of the Will 
directs the Personal Representative to sell the Testator's real 
property and to add the proceeds to the estate for use and 
distribution under the Will. The doctrine of equitable conversion 
provides that when a testator directs his or her real property to 
be sold, the property must be regarded as personal property from 
the time of testator's death and must be distributed according to 
the testator's plan of personal property distribution. A 
testator's intent to convert realty to personalty may be shown by 
express instruction, by implied direction, or by necessity in order 
to carry out all of the provisions of the will. The Will at issue 
in this case clearly converts the Testator's real property into 
personal property. 
The Testator disposed of all of his personal property under 
the THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the Will. The SIXTH Article 
disposes of "all articles of personal, household or domestic use 
or adornment," with certain exceptions. The THIRD Article of the 
Will makes various devises of personal property and then grants a 
power of appointment to two of the Testator's close friends and his 
son to distribute "the remaining items of personal property." This 
language may reasonably be construed to dispose of the residue of 
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the Testator's personal property, including the real property 
proceeds. This construction is confirmed by: (l) the broad 
definitions of the terms "personal property" and "items of . 
personal property" contained in the Utah Code; (2) the numerous 
provisions in the Will that are inconsistent with a claim of 
intestacy; and (3) the Testator's use of different terms to refer 
to various types of personal property. Alternatively, the 
Testator's bequest of "all articles of personal, household, or 
domestic use" in the SIXTH Article of the Will may reasonably be 
construed to dispose of the personal property residue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WILL MUST BE CONSTRUED TO EFFECTUATE 
THE TESTATOR'S INTENT. 
The primary purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate Code is "to 
discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in 
distribution of his property." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 (1953). 
"The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the 
legal effect of his dispositions." Id. § 75-2-603. Thus, "[t]he 
paramount objective in interpreting a will is to give effect to the 
intent and desire of the testator . . . ." In re Estate of 
Wallich. 18 Utah 2d 240, 420 P.2d 40, 42 (1966). In order to 
determine the testator's intent, the will "should be read and 
understood as a whole, and meaning given to all of its provisions 
considered in their relationship to each other." In re Estate of 
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Wallich. 420 P.2d at 42; see also In re Estate of Gardner. 615 P.2d 
1215, 1217 (Utah 1980). 
POINT II 
PETITIONER MUST OVERCOME THE STRONG 
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INTESTACY. 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code establishes a strong presumption 
that a testator, in making a will, intends to dispose of all of his 
or her property and avoid intestacy in whole or in part: 
A will is construed to pass all property 
which the testator owns at his death including 
property acquired after the execution of the 
will. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953) (emphasis added). Those claiming 
that a testator intended to die intestate bear the burden of 
establishing that intent. See Id. § 75-3-407. 
In the case of In re Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d 1215 (Utah 
1980), this Court explained the practical, legal effect of the 
presumption against intestacy: 
Based on the presumption against intestacy, 
the court will adopt any reasonable 
construction [of a will] to avoid a conclusion 
of intestacy. 
Id. at 1217 (emphasis added). Numerous other jurisdictions follow 
the identical standard. See, e.g.. Booth v. Krua. 368 111. 487, 
14 N.E.2d 645, 649 (1938) ("The presumption against intestacy is 
so strong that the court will adopt any reasonable construction to 
avoid it"); Estate of Rose v. Loucks, 772 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Mo. Ct. 
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App. 1989); Smith v. Estate of Peters, 741 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Alaska 
1987).3 
In this case, Petitioner claims that he is entitled to a 
portion of the Testator's assets by way of intestate succession. 
The Will effectively precludes Petitioner from making any claim 
under the Will. [Last Will and Testament, NINTH Article.] See. 
e
«q* / In re Estate of Jones. 759 P.2d 345, 348-50 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (parent may intentionally omit child from will). Since this 
Court will adopt "any reasonable construction" of the Will to avoid 
intestacy, In re Estate of Gardner. 615 P. 2d at 1217, and 
Petitioner is claiming that the Testator died intestate as to most 
of his property, Petitioner must establish that the only reasonable 
construction of the Will results in intestacy. 
POINT III 
THE TESTATOR18 WILL DISPOSES OF ALL OF HIS REAL 
PROPERTY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION. 
Petitioner claims that the Testator died completely intestate 
as to his real property. Petitioner argues that the Testator made 
no provision in his Will for the disposition of real property and 
that the SEVENTH Article of the Will recognizes that there would 
3The presumption against intestacy is so firmly established as 
to be beyond dispute. See, e.g., Hoover v. Sims. 792 S.W.2d 171, 
174 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) , writ denied; In re Estate of Bennett. 789 
P.2d 446, 448 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied (Colo. 1990); New 
Mexico Bovs' Ranch. Inc. v. Hanvev. 97 N.M. 771, 643 P.2d 857, 859 
(1982); In re Estate of Ikuta. 64 Haw. 236, 639 P.2d 400, 406 
(1981) ("The law abhors intestacy and presumes against it"); In re 
Estate of Foster. 82 Nev. 97, 411 P.2d 482, 483 (1966); In re Trust 
Estate of Weill. 48 Haw. 553, 406 P.2d 718, 724 (Haw. 1965). 
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be real property left in the estate. [Appellant's Brief, at 14-
15.] These contentions must be rejected. 
A. The Will Mandates a Sale of the Testator's Real Property. 
The Testator's directions concerning the disposition of his 
real property are contained in Article SEVENTH of the Will. The 
Petitioner notably avoids quoting all of the pertinent language of 
that section. The SEVENTH Article provides: 
I hereby direct my Personal 
Representative to borrow monies against my 
real property located in Virgin, Utah and to 
pay whatever sums are necessary for the 
maintenance, upkeep and preservation of my 
ranch in Virgin, Utah and also the salaries of 
my employees until such time as the ranch is 
sold . . . . All monies borrowed against the 
real property in Virgin, Utah are to be paid 
back immediately upon the sale of said 
property. I authorize my Personal 
Representative to sell all real property, 
together with all tangible personal property 
and livestock included in my estate and not 
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles 
THIRD and SIXTH hereof, at such time or times 
and upon such terms and conditions as shall 
seem advisable and to add the proceeds of any 
such sale to my estate. 
[Last Will and Testament, Article SEVENTH (emphasis added.) 
This language, when read in full, clearly conveys the 
Testator's intent that his real property be sold. The Testator 
directs the Personal Representative to borrow money against the 
real property for maintaining the Ranch "until such time as the 
ranch is sold." The Testator then requires that such loans be 
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repaid "immediately upon the sale of said property." These 
provisions create a scheme which mandates the sale of the Ranch/ 
In addition, this interpretation is the only construction of 
the Will that is consistent with the other provisions of the Will. 
The SECOND Article of the Will directs the personal representative 
to pay all of the Testator's "just debts, funeral expenses, and 
expenses of [his] last illness . . . ." The FIFTH Article of the 
Will further provides that "any inheritance, succession, estate, 
transfer, legacy or duty or tax which shall become payable . . . 
in respect to any property or interest passing under this [Will] 
. . . shall be paid out of or charged against my Utah estate in the 
manner hereinabove provided, as if it were a debt and without 
apportionment." (Emphasis added.) 
It is undisputed that the Testator's estate lacks sufficient 
assets for the payment of his debts, the estate taxes, the costs 
of administration, and the costs of maintaining the Ranch, while 
at the same time satisfying the specific bequests made in the Will. 
The only possible way to effectuate the Testator's intent with 
respect to all of these provisions is to sell the Ranch and use the 
proceeds for the payment of these costs and expenses. Since the 
Testator is presumed to have been aware of the nature and extent 
4This construction of the SEVENTH Article is consistent with 
the pattern set by the Testator in the SECOND Article of the Will. 
The SECOND Article states: "I hereby direct [payment] of all my 
just debts . . . ." It then provides authorization: "I hereby 
authorize and empower my executor . . . to settle and discharge 
[claims made against the estate]." The SEVENTH Article of the Will 
also begins with the command, "I hereby direct," and follows with 
the requisite authorization. 
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of his estate, and the fact that his assets were insufficient to 
carry out his objectives without a sale of the real property, see 
In re Suppesf Estate, 185 A. 616, 617 (Pa. 1936), the inescapable 
conclusion is that the Testator intended his real property to be 
sold to accomplish his purposes. 
The THIRD Article of the Will also confirms this construction 
of the Will. It states that "All the rest residue, and remainder 
of my estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever kind and nature 
and wheresoever the same may be situated of which I shall die 
seized or possess to which in any way I may be entitled at the time 
of my death . . . , I give, devise, and bequeath as follows . . . 
.
tf
 (Emphasis added.) This language clearly expresses the 
Testator's intent to dispose of all his assets under the Will, 
including his real property. The fact that the subsections of 
Article THIRD do not mention real property only confirms the fact 
that the Testator understood and intended that his real property 
would be sold pursuant to the SEVENTH Article of the Will.5 
5The presumption against intestacy is so strong that courts in 
some instances have even construed the term "personal property" to 
include a decedent's real property. See, e.g., Davisson v. 
Sparrow. 97 N.E.2d 694, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); Gilkev v. 
Chambers, 146 Tex. 355, 207 S.W.2d 70, 73 (1947); In re Estate of 
Olsen, 9 Cal. App. 2d 374, 50 P.2d 70, 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935). 
These courts simply interpret the term "personal property" to mean 
property which the testator owned "personally." See id. 
In this case, the decedent made a devise in the THIRD Section 
of the Will of his "remaining items of personal property." [Will, 
Article THIRD, E.2.] The opening paragraph of that Section 
devises "All the rest, residue, and remainder of [decedent's] 
estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever kind and nature and 
wheresoever . . . situated . . . ." In light of this language, and 
the strong presumption against intestacy, the Court could conclude 
that the decedent's real property passes under the THIRD Section 
of the Will. 
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Despite these clear manifestations of the Testator1 intent, 
Petitioner claims that ,f[t]he Will contains a provision dealing 
with real estate which is consistent with its [purported] failure 
to dispose of any real property." [Appellant's Brief, at 14.] 
Petitioner argues that "the SEVENTH Article of the Will is an 
authorization for the personal representative to 'sell all real 
property" included in the estate fnot effectively disposed of 
pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof . . . ." [id. 
(Emphasis Petitioner's).] Petitioner contends that this language 
"specifically recognizes" that real property would remain in the 
estate after the dispositions made in Articles THIRD and SIXTH. 
This argument does not withstand even the most rudimentary 
textual analysis. The provision in question, which Petitioner only 
partially quotes, reads as follows: 
I authorize my Personal Representative to sell 
all real property, together with all tangible 
personal property and livestock included in my 
estate and not effectively disposed of 
pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof, 
at such time or times and upon such terms and 
conditions as shall seem advisable and to add 
the proceeds of any such sale to my estate. 
[Last Will and Testament, Article SEVENTH (emphasis added).] The 
structure and punctuation of this sentence clearly demonstrates 
that the clause "included in my estate and not effectively disposed 
of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof" does not apply to 
the term "real property" but applies only to the Testator's 
"tangible personal property." This language, therefore, does not 
indicate that there would be real property remaining in the 
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Testator's estate after all distributions are made. It merely 
recognizes that some of the Testator's "tangible personal property" 
may not be distributed in kind under the THIRD and SIXTH Articles 
of the Will and should, therefore, be sold and distributed as 
money.6 
To the extent that Petitioner is attempting to create an 
ambiguity in the SEVENTH Article of the Will, Utah law provides two 
means of resolving the dispute. First, the presumption against 
intestacy obliges the Court to adopt "any reasonable construction" 
of the Will that "avoid[s] a conclusion of intestacy." In re 
Estate of Gardner, 615 P. 2d at 1217; see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-
604 (1953). In light of the other provisions of the Will, the 
Personal Representative's construction of the SEVENTH Article not 
only provides a reasonable construction of the Will, it is the only 
reasonable construction. Second, to the extent that the SEVENTH 
Article of the Will is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible 
to show the Testator's intent. See Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 804 
P.2d 540, 542-43 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Godfrey v. Chandlev, 248 
Kan. 975, 811 P.2d 1248, 1251 (1991). The extrinsic evidence in 
this case indicates that the Testator intended his Ranch to be sold 
and the proceeds to be used to pay his debts, the estate taxes, and 
furthermore, the Testator's reference in the SEVENTH Article 
to "any such sale" does not indicate that a sale of the Ranch is 
discretionary. That same sentence of Article SEVENTH also refers 
to a sale of any "tangible personal property" not effectively 
disposed of under the THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the Will. Since 
a sale of "tangible personal property" was not inevitable (it could 
all be distributed in kind under Articles THIRD and SIXTH) it was 
perfectly consistent for the Testator to refer to "any such sale" 
of that property. 
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the expenses of administration. [Affidavit of James M. Park J 12, 
R. 86.] The SEVENTH Article of the Will must, therefore, be 
construed as a mandate that the Personal Representative sell the 
Testator's real property. 
B. The Will Converts the Testator's Real Property into 
Personalty under the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion. 
Petitioner next contends that the Will does not convert the 
Testator's real property into personal property for purposes of 
distribution. [Appellant's Brief, at 16.] Petitioner maintains 
that the District Court improperly invoked the doctrine of 
equitable conversion in concluding that the Testator's real 
property passed under the Will as personal property. Petitioner 
advances three arguments to avoid application of that doctrine in 
this case: (1) the doctrine of equitable conversion by will is not 
the law in Utah; (2) equitable conversion does not apply unless a 
will contains a mandatory direction to sell real property; and (3) 
any discretion with respect to the sale of the real property 
prevents application of the doctrine. [Appellant's Brief, at 16-
18.] These contentions must be rejected. 
1. The doctrine of equitable conversion provides the 
rule of decision in this case. 
The doctrine of "[e]quitable conversion is generally defined 
as that change in the nature of property by which, for certain 
purposes, real estate is considered as personalty or personalty is 
considered as realty and the property is transmissible as so 
considered." Parson v. Wolfe, 676 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1984). (emphasis added); see, e.g., Holzhauser v. Iowa State Tax 
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Comm'n. 62 N.W.2d 229, 232 (Iowa 1953); In re Livingston's Estate. 
9 P.2d 159, 163 (Mont- 1932); Citizens1 Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 222 P. 935, 937 (N.M. 1924). As the court explained in 
Lampman v. Sledge, 502 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973): 
The most common case of equitable conversion 
occurs where the provisions of a will 
expressly or impliedly direct that the 
testator's real property be sold and the 
proceeds distributed. In contemplation of law 
the realty will be deemed sold as of the date 
of the death of the testator, and for the 
purpose of distribution will be treated as 
personalty and not as land. 
Id. at 959. 
The effects of this rule are binding upon the courts and all 
persons concerned with the property: 
[T]he doctrine of equitable conversion is a 
rule of necessity, not of convenience. It is 
a rule of necessity in the sense that, when a 
person has exercised a power over his 
property, as he has a right to do, by will or 
deed, the change in the character of the 
property which he has directed becomes binding 
upon all persons thereafter concerned with the 
same. 
Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 222 P. at 940. 
Petitioner correctly points out that there are no reported 
Utah cases applying the doctrine of equitable conversion by will. 
That fact, however, does not mean that the doctrine of equitable 
conversion by will is inapplicable in Utah. Section 68-3-1 of the 
Utah Code provides: 
Petitioner concedes, of course, that this Court has applied 
the doctrine of equitable conversion by contract. [Appellant's 
Brief, at 16.] 
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The common law of England so far as it is 
[consistent with federal and state law and 
policy] is hereby adopted, and shall be the 
rule of decision in all courts of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953) (emphasis added). 
This Court has explained that Section 68-3-1 adopts the 
common law of England as it has been adopted and expounded by the 
courts of last resort of this country. Cahoon v. Pelton. 9 Utah 
2d 224, 342 P.2d 94, 98 (1959); see also State v. c.R.. 797 P.2d 
459, 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The term "common law" is broadly 
defined as that great body of non-statutory or unwritten law which 
is founded on custom and usage and in which the courts have long 
acquiesced. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Common Law § l (1976) ; see, e.g.. 
Windust v. Department of Labor & Indus.. 52 Wash. 2d 33, 323 P.2d 
241, 243 (1958) . 
Equitable conversion by will fully satisfies the requirements 
of Section 68-3-1. The doctrine was first developed in the courts 
of England over three hundred years ago. Parson. 676 S.W.2d at 
691. It has since been adopted and expounded by an overwhelming 
majority of courts in this country.8 While this Court has not yet 
The doctrine of equitable conversion by will is so firmly 
rooted in the common law of this country as to be beyond dispute. 
See, e.g.. Parson. 676 S.W.2d at 691 (Texas); Dinkins v. Convers. 
382 So.2d 1129, 1131 (Ala. 1980); Atkinson v. Van Echaute. 366 
S.W.2d 273, 274 (Ark. 1963); Holzhauser. 62 N.W.2d at 232 (Iowa); 
Kikel v. Kikel. 372 Pa. 200, 93 A.2d 443, 445 (1953); Wollard v. 
Sulier. 55 N.M. 326, 232 P.2d 991, 994 (1951); Elmore v. Austin. 
232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205, 213 (1950); Kuiken v. Simonds. 3 N.J. 
480, 70 A.2d 740, 743 (1950); Zulver Realty Co.. Inc. v. Snvder. 
62 A.2d 276, 279 (Md. Ct. App. 1948); In re Ellertson's Estate. 157 
Kan. 492, 142 P.2d 724, 729 (1943); Hahn v. Verret. 11 N.W.2d 551, 
559 (Neb. 1943); In re Livingston's Estate. 9 P.2d at 159 (Mont.); 
Trotter v. Van Pelt. 198 So. 215, 218 (Fla. 1940); John v. Turner. 
6 S.E.2d 480, 482 (W. Va. 1939); In re Rowland's Estate. 273 N.Y. 
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had occasion to address equitable conversion by will, the Court has 
recognized the doctrine of equitable conversion by contract. See, 
e.a.- Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1255 (Utah 1987). As 
will be shown below, the doctrine of equitable conversion by will 
is completely consistent with Utah law and policy. The doctrine 
of equitable conversion by will is, therefore, the law of this 
State and provides the rule of decision in this case. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953); Cahoon, 342 P.2d at 98. 
2. A will need not contain a mandatory instruction to 
sell in order to cause an equitable conversion. 
Petitioner quotes several general statements from various 
secondary sources to argue that "if a will does not contain a 
mandatory instruction to sell the real estate, the real estate 
cannot be converted and pass as personal property." [Appellant's 
Brief, at 17.]9 Petitioner fails to note, however, that the 
100, 6 N.E.2d 393, 395 (1937); Reynold's Executor v. Reynolds. 218 
S.W. 1001, 1003 (Ky Ct. App. 1920); In re Stephenson's Estate, 177 
N.W. 579, 583 (Wis. 1920); Grove v. Willard, 280 111. 247, 117 N.E. 
489, 492 (1917); Greenman v. McVev. 126 Minn. 21, 147 N.W. 812, 
813-14 (1914); Martin v. Preston, 94 P. 1087, 1089 (Wash. 1908); 
In re Pforr's Estate, 77 P. 825, 827 (Cal. 1904). Many of these 
jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Probate Code, as has Utah. 
See 8 Uniform Laws Annotated, Estate, Probate and Related Laws, at 
1 (1983 & Supp. 1991). 
Petitioner attempts to bolster this argument by contending 
that equitable conversion by contract under Utah law applies only 
when the duty to sell is "absolute." That statement is inaccurate. 
An earnest money agreement, for example, effects an equitable 
conversion of real property even though the agreement is subject 
to conditions. Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); see also Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1255 (Utah 
1987) ("The vendor's retention of legal title is usually coupled 
with a contract right to forfeit the vendee's interest and to take 
back the vendee's interests if the vendee defaults"). 
In any event, equitable conversion by will and equitable 
conversion by contract rest on different grounds. See Parson, 676 
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secondary sources on which he relies explain that a testator's 
direction to sell real property "may be express or implied," 27 Am. 
Jur
- 2d, Equitable Conversion § 5, at 487 (1966), and that the 
power of sale conferred by a will need not be "in terms imperative" 
in order to work an equitable conversion. Id. § 7, at 491.10 The 
Petitioner's claim that a will must contain an express command to 
sell real property in order to cause an equitable conversion must, 
therefore, be rejected. Cases applying the doctrine of equitable 
conversion confirm this conclusion. 
The "sole purpose of the doctrine [of equitable conversion] 
in the case of a will is to effectuate [the] testator's intent." 
McCaughna v. Bilhorn, 10 Cal. App. 2d 674, 52 P.2d 1025, 1928 
(1935); accord Funk v. Funk, 563 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 
S.W.2d at 691 n.2 (quoting Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law 
of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 561 n.10 
(1935) (equitable conversion by will "depends on the intention of 
the testator," whereas equitable conversion by contract is based 
upon "rules of law as to consequences of the right to specific 
performance of a land contract"). 
10
 Since a direction to sell [real property] 
need not be express in order for it to be 
imperative, and it can be implied in a proper 
case, if a testator authorizes his executors 
to sell his real estate and it is apparent from 
the general provisions of the will that it was 
his intention that the power to sell so 
conferred by him should be exercised, such 
power will be construed as a direction to sell 
and will operate as an equitable conversion, 
although it is not in terms imperative. 
27 Am. Jur. 2d Equitable Conversion § 7, at 491 (1966) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Page, Page on Wills^ § 46.3 
(stating that a power of sale which "may be exercised entirely at 
the discretion of the executors or trustees, does not, of itself, 
work a conversion"). 
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1990); Parson, 676 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Citizen's Natfl 
Bank, 222 P. at 937-38 • The doctrine "is grounded on the maxim 
that equity regards as done that which in fairness and good 
conscience should be done." Parson, 676 S.W..2d at 691; accord 
Wollard v. Sulier, 55 N.M. 326, 232 P.2d 991, 994 (1951); Kuiken 
v. Simonds, 3 N.J. 480, 70 A.2d 740, 743 (1949). The testator's 
intent is, therefore, "of paramount and controlling importance" in 
determining whether a will converts real property to personalty. 
Wollard, 232 P.2d at 994 (quoting Citizens1 Nat'l Bank, 222 P. at 
937); accord Atkinson v. Van Echaute, 366 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Ark. 
1963) ("Intent is the determining factor"); In re Ellertson's 
Estate, 157 Kan. 492, 142 P.2d 724, 729 (1943); McCaughna, 52 P.2d 
at 1025; In re Edwards' Estate, 168 Pa. Super. 471, 79 A.2d 138, 
140 (1951); Trotter v. Van Pelt, 198 So. 215, 218 (Fla. 1940); 
Talbott v. Compher, 110 A. 100, 101 (Md. Ct. App. 1920); Grove v. 
Willard, 280 111. 247, 117 N.E. 489, 492 (1917). 
A testator's intent to convert real property into personal 
property may be shown in three different ways: (1) a positive 
direction to sell, (2) an implied direction to sell, or (3) 
necessity to sell in order to carry out the provisions of the will. 
See, e.g. , Wollard, 232 P.2d at 994-95; McCaughna, 52 P.2d at 1028; 
Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 222 P. at 938; Martin v. Preston, 94 P. 1087, 
1089 (Wash. 1908); In re Pforr's Estate, 77 P. 825, 827 (Cal. 
1904); Lampman, 502 S.W.2d at 959; Zulver Realty Co., Inc. v. 
Snyder, 62 A.2d 276, 279 (Md. Ct. App. 1948); Hahn v. Verret, 11 
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N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb, 1943); In re Stephenson's Estate. 177 N.W. 
579, 583 (Wis. 1920); Grove, 117 N.E. at 492. 
An implied direction to sell arises when consideration of the 
entire will shows that the testator intended his or her real 
property to be sold, even though the will simply authorizes rather 
than commands a sale of the real property: 
[T]he inquiry is always as to the 
intention of the testator. It is not so much 
the words that he employs as it is his 
intention as derived from the entire 
instrument. The whole theory of conversion 
rests upon the intention of the testator. 
That is the great guide in determining whether 
there has been an equitable conversion of 
realty into personalty. There have been many 
cases where there was no express direction to 
sell, but where it was apparent from the 
general provisions of the will that the 
testator intended the real estate to be sold. 
In these cases it has been universally held 
that a direction would be implied, and an 
equitable conversion worked. 
Greenman v. McVev, 126 Minn. 21, 147 N.W. 812, 813-14 (1914); 
accord McCaughna, 52 P.2d at 1028; Citizens' Natfl Bank, 222 P. at 
938; In re Pforr's Estate, 77 P. at 827; see also Martin, 94 P. at 
1089; Hahn, 11 N.W.2d at 559. 
A testator's direction to sell arises by necessity where the 
personal representative is authorized to sell real property and a 
sale is necessary in order to carry out the provisions of the will: 
[W]here the provisions of a will cannot be 
carried out without converting the realty into 
personalty, and the conditions are such that 
the testator must have contemplated that such 
conversion would take place to that end, 
courts of equity deal with the estate as 
personal property from the time the will takes 
effect—from the death of the testator. 
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Hahn, 11 N.W.2d at 559; accord Citizens' Natfl Bank, 222 P. at 938; 
In re Bondv's Estate, 118 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (Sur. Ct. 1952); In re 
Stephenson's Estate, 177 N.W. at 583; Greenman. 147 N.W. at 814. 
This condition occurs most frequently when the testator has not 
otherwise provided sufficient assets for the payment of debts, 
taxes, and/or expenses of administration. See, e.g., Wollard, 232 
P.2d at 994; In re Edwards' Estate, 79 A.2d at 140; Zulver Realty 
Co. , 62 A.2d at 279; Hahn, 11 N.W.2d at 560; Camden Trust Co. .v 
Haldeman, 33 A.2d 611, 614 (N.J. Ch. 1943), aff'd, 40 A.2d 601 
(N.J. 1945). 
When a direction to sell real property is implied from the 
testator's intent or established by necessity, the duty to sell 
becomes as mandatory as if it had been expressly commanded: 
When the direction to convert is apparent from 
the whole will, whether expressed or implied, 
the duty and obligation to convert are 
imperative. 
Grove, 117 N.E. at 492; accord Citizens1 Nat'l Bank, 222 P. at 938 
("This implied intention . . . becomes as mandatory on the 
executors and trustees, and as effectual to work conversion as if 
so expressed in the will11); Greenman, 147 N.W. at 814; see also 
McCaughna, 52 P. 2d at 1028 ("While the desire of a testator for the 
disposal of his estate is a mere request when addressed to his 
devisee, it is to be construed as a command when addressed to his 
executor"). An implied duty to sell, therefore, fully satisfies 
the purported requirement that the duty to sell must be "mandatory" 
or "absolute" in order to work an equitable conversion. See, e.g. , 
Greenman, 147 N.W. at 813-14. 
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3. Discretion as to the time, terms, and manner of sale 
does not defeat equitable conversion. 
Petitioner also implies that the doctrine of equitable 
conversion cannot be applied if the personal representative has any 
discretion regarding the sale of the testator's real property. 
[Appellant's Brief, at 17.] That implication is erroneous. The 
fact that a personal representative "is vested with some discretion 
as to the time, terms, and manner of sale does not militate against 
the doctrine of equitable conversion." Trotter. 198 So. at 218; 
accord In re Livingston's Estate. 9 P.2d at 163; In re Myers' 
Estate. 234 Iowa 502, 12 N.W.2d 211, 213 (1943); Talbott. 110 A. 
at 102); Grove, 117 N.E. at 492. To conclude otherwise would be 
to defeat the testator's intent. See id. 
4. This Court should reject the rigid, mechanical 
approach advanced by Petitioner. 
The flexible approach described above is completely consistent 
with, and actively promotes, the policies and purposes of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code. The main purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code is "to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent's 
in distribution of his [or her] property." Utah Code Ann. § 75-
1-102 (1953); see also In re Estate of Wallich. 420 P.2d at 42. 
The "sole purpose" of the doctrine of equitable conversion is to 
effectuate the decedent's intent. McCaughna, 52 P.2d at 1028. 
Under Utah law, the testator's intent, as expressed in his or her 
will, controls the legal effect of his or her dispositions. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-2-603 (1953). Under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion, the testator's intent, as expressed in his or her will, 
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is of "paramount and controlling importance." Wollard, 232 P.2d 
at 994. These principles, therefore, confirm and complement each 
other. 
This Court has also indicated that a will should be examined 
in its entirety, "and meaning given to all of its provisions 
considered in their relationship to each other," in order to 
determine the testator's intent. In re Estate of Wallich, 42 0 P. 2d 
at 42. A flexible approach to equitable conversion advances this 
policy, because it permits and encourages the court to determine 
the testator's intent by examining the entirety of the will, see 
In re Livingston's Estate, 9 P.2d at 163, rather than by focusing 
on one or two isolated phrases. As the court stated in Kikel v. 
KiJcel, 372 Pa. 200, 93 A.2d 443, 445 (1953): 
[Q]uestions [concerning equitable conversion] 
cannot be decided by rigid mechanical 
application of any formula but require in each 
case a determination of the intention of the 
testator as revealed in his will. 
Kikel, 93 A. 2d at 445. A flexible approach to equitable conversion 
is also consistent with the presumption against intestacy. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953); Greenman, 147 N.W. at 814. 
In contrast, the approach advanced by Petitioner would require 
that a will contain an express command to sell in order to effect 
an equitable conversion. [See Appellant's Brief, at 16-17.] This 
rigid, mechanical approach is fundamentally inconsistent with Utah 
law and policy. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 (1953) ; In re Estate 
of Wallich, 420 P.2d at 42. Such an approach would condition the 
effect of a testator's dispositions on an incantation of key words 
— 97 — 
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and phrases, rather than on the testator's intent as shown by the 
entirety of the will. It would defeat the testator's intent in 
every instance where the will manifests a clear implied intent that 
the real property be sold but does not contain an express command 
to sell. It would also defeat the testator's intent in every 
instance where a sale of real property is necessary to carry out 
the testator's testamentary plan, but the will contains no express 
command to sell. 
The Petitioner's approach would also discriminate against 
those who are compelled or choose to draft their own wills, see, 
e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-503 (1953) (validating holographic 
wills), since many such individuals would be unlikely to know the 
formal requirements for equitable conversion. In addition, the 
Petitioner's suggested approach contradicts the strong statutory 
presumption against intestacy. See Id. § 75-2-604. For all of 
these reasons, this Court should reject the rigid, mechanical 
approach advocated by Petitioner. See Kikel, 93 A.2d at 445. 
5. The Testatorfs Will converts his realty into 
personalty. 
In this case, the Testator's Will effects an equitable 
conversion of the Ranch into personal property, because it is clear 
from the entirety of the Will that the Testator intended his Ranch 
to be sold. See, e.g., McCaughna, 52 P.2d at 1028 (direction 
implied from testator's intent). The Will also effects an 
equitable conversion of the Ranch by necessity, in order to carry 
out the provision of the Will. It would be impossible to satisfy 
all of the Testator's debts, the estate taxes, and the costs of 
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administration, while at the same time satisfying all of the 
specific bequests made in the Will, without selling the Ranch. 
See, e.g., Wollard, 232 P. 2d at 994 (necessity). The District 
Court, therefore, correctly treated the Testator's real property 
as personalty under the doctrine of equitable conversion. 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion in similar 
cases. In Read v. Maryland General Hospital, 146 A. 742 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1929) , the court addressed the issue of whether the proceeds 
from the sale of the testator's real property passed to the her 
residual personal property beneficiary or to her heirs in 
intestacy. Id. at 74 3. The decedent's will stated: 
I hereby authorize and empower my executor . 
. . to sell all my real estate, either at 
public or private sale, in parcels, lots, or 
in its entirety, . . . as in his discretion he 
may deem proper for the best interest of my 
estate, and make distribution of the proceeds 
derived therefrom in conformity with [my 
will]. 
Id. (emphasis added) . Just as the Petitioner argues in this case, 
the heirs in Read argued that because the will only "authorize[d] 
and empower [ed]" rather than commanded the executor to sell the 
real property, the will did not work an equitable conversion. Id. 
The court rejected this argument, concluding that the will 
"manifest[ed] a clear intention" that the testator's real property 
"be converted into money." Id. The court granted the proceeds of 
sale to the personal property beneficiary. See id. 
In Fahnestock v. Fahnestock, 25 A. 313 (Pa. 1892), the court 
construed a will which stated: "I hereby empower and authorize my 
executors to sell all my real estate . . . ." Id^ . The testator 
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subsequently stated that ff[a]ll the rest and residue of my estate 
(real and personal) I give, devise, and bequeath as follows . . . 
." Id. at 314. One of the beneficiaries of the residuary clause 
brought suit to partition the testator's real property. Id. The 
court rejected the request for partition, concluding that the 
doctrine of equitable conversion applied: 
It is apparent on the face of the will that 
the testator intended his property, real and 
personal, should be converted into money, for 
distribution, investment, and the collection 
and payment of interest or income as he had 
directed. 
Id. at 315. 
In In re Suppes1 Estate, 185 A. 616 (Pa. 1936), the testator's 
will authorized the sale of her real property but did not contain 
an express direction to sell. Id. at 617. The will directed that 
the testator's debts, the costs of "all repairs and taxes necessary 
to keep up the homestead, as well as the living expenses of the 
family, be paid 'out of my estate."1 Id. The testator's personal 
property, however, had been "specifically bequeathed." Id. The 
testator's "residuary estate, real, personal and mixed, was 
divided" between five individuals. One of the five residuary 
beneficiaries brought suit to partition the testator's real 
property. Id. at 616. The other residuary beneficiaries opposed 
this action, contending that the proceeds of the testator's real 
property became personal property under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion and were to be used for the payment of the testator's 
debts, the costs of maintaining the homestead, and the family's 
living expenses. See id. at 616-17. 
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The court rejected the petition for partition, concluding that 
the real estate had been converted to personalty by necessary 
implication. Id. at 617. The court explained: 
The testatrix is presumed to have been aware 
of the nature of her estate and of the fact 
that her personal property was entirely 
insufficient to raise an income sufficient for 
the [above-enumerated] purposes. She must, 
therefore, have intended a conversion to carry 
out these provisions. It would be impossible 
to pay the decedent's debts, keep up repairs, 
pay taxes and the living expenses of her 
family, and carry out the instructions with 
relation to the children without a sale of the 
real estate. 
Id. The Testator in this case is similarly presumed to have been 
aware that his estate would be insufficient, without the sale of 
the Ranch, to accomplish his purposes. 
In the case of In re Edwards1 Estate, 168 Pa. Super. 471, 79 
A.2d 138 (1951), the court addressed the issue of whether proceeds 
from the sale of the testator's real property passed under the will 
or by way of intestacy. 79 A.2d at 139. The testator owned three 
parcels of real estate at her death, but her personal property was 
insufficient to pay her debts and various cash bequests. Id. The 
testator's will contained a passing reference to the sale of one 
of the parcels of real property but otherwise contained no 
direction or authorization to sell. Id. at 140. 
The court discussed the rule of equitable conversion by 
necessity and concluded that it applied because "the personal 
property of testatrix was entirely insufficient to pay debts and 
legacies." Id. The court concluded that any proceeds remaining 
after the payment of the testator's debts and bequests would pass 
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under the will as "cash," rather than to her heir in intestacy. 
Id. at 139-40; see also Wollard. 232 P.2d at 991 (the proceeds of 
the decedent's real property were converted to personalty and 
provided "the primary fund for the payment of debts, expenses, and 
inheritance taxes"); Fahnestock, 25 A. at 315 (equitable conversion 
applied because it "was not possible to execute certain provisions 
. • . of the will without a conversion of the real estate . . . 
into money). 
Lastly, even under the rigid, mechanical approach advanced by 
Petitioner, the Will converts the Testator's real property into 
personal property. As shown above, the SEVENTH Article of the Will 
creates a scheme which includes language of command and mandates 
a sale of the property. The Testator's real property was, 
therefore, converted to personalty. 
C. The Will Disposes of the Real Property Proceeds. 
Petitioner's final argument concerning the real property is 
that the Will does not dispose of the Ranch proceeds. Petitioner 
contends that the Testatorfs direction in Article SEVENTH of the 
Will to add the Ranch proceeds "to my estate" must be construed to 
mean that the Personal Representative must add the proceeds to the 
Testator's estate in intestacy. Petitioner notes that the term 
"estate" could be construed to mean "all the decedent's property, 
whether passing by will, by trust, or by intestacy." [Appellant's 
Brief, at 19.] This argument should be rejected for at least four 
compelling reasons. 
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First, Petitioner's argument simply begs the question, since 
there can be no estate in intestacy unless the Will fails to 
dispose of the residue of the Testator's personal property. 
Second, the phrase "add the proceeds . . . to my estate" must be 
construed, if at all possible, to avoid intestacy. In re Estate 
of Gardner. 615 P.2d at 1217; see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953). 
The most reasonable construction of that language is that the 
proceeds should be added to the Testator's estate for use and 
distribution under the Will. Third, to the extent that the 
language is ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence establishes that the 
Testator intended the proceeds to be used for payment of debts, 
estate taxes, and other expenses, with the residue passing under 
the Will. [Affidavit of James M. Park, J 5, R. 84.] Finally, the 
cases applying the doctrine of equitable conversion indicate that 
converted proceeds pass according to the testator's plan of 
personal property distribution. See, e.g., Read, 146 A. at 743 
(proceeds pass to personal property beneficiaries, not to heirs); 
In re Edwards' Estate. 79 A.2d at 139-40 (same). 
For all of these reasons, the District Court correctly 
concluded that the Testator died testate as to all of his real 
property. The real property must be sold and, by virtue of the 
doctrine of equitable conversion, the proceeds must be treated as 
personalty for use and distribution under the Will. 
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POINT IV 
THE WILL DISPOSES OF ALL OF THE TESTATOR»S PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
Petitioner claims that the Testator died partially intestate 
as to his personal property for three reasons: (1) the Will 
contains no clause disposing of the Testator's personal property 
residue; (2) the SEVENTH Article of the Will recognizes the limited 
scope of Articles THIRD and SIXTH; and (3) the manner of 
disposition under Article THIRD, subparagraph E. 2 . "is inconsistent 
with disposition of the bulk of the estate." [Appellant's Brief, 
at 2 0-2 6.] These arguments should be rejected. 
A* The Relevant Standards of Interpretation Require a Broad 
Construction of the Will's Personal Property Provisions. 
The personal property provisions of the Will must be construed 
broadly, consistent with the relevant standards of interpretation. 
1. The Utah Code provides a broad definition of the 
term "personal property." 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code defines the term "property" very 
broadly: "'Property1 includes both real and personal property or 
any interest therein and means anything that may be the subject of 
ownership." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(33) (Supp. 1991). The Utah 
Code also supplies a broad definition of the term "personal 
property:" 
"Personal property" includes every description 
of money, goods, chattels, effects, evidences of 
rights in action, and all written instruments by 
which any pecuniary obligation, right, or title to 
property is created, acknowledged, transferred, 
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increased, defeated, discharged, or diminished, and 
every right or interest therein. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12 (2) (m) (Supp. 1991). The dispositive 
provisions of the Will dealing with "personal property" must, 
therefore, be construed broadly in light of this definition. 
2. The personal property provisions must be construed 
so far as possible to avoid intestacy. 
The strong statutory presumption against intestacy requires 
the Court to adopt "any reasonable construction [of the Will] so 
as to avoid a conclusion of intestacy•" In re Estate of Gardner. 
615 P.2d at 1217; see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953). The 
presumption is particularly strong when the testator has employed 
language resembling a residuary clause. See, e.g.. North Carolina 
Nat'l Bank v. Apple, 95 N.C. App. 606, 383 S.E.2d 438, 440 (1989); 
Estate of Rose, 772 S.W.2d at 889; In re Estate of Shaw, 182 111. 
App. 3d 847, 538 N.E.2d 643, 645 (1989). No particular words are 
necessary to create a residuary clause. See, e.g., In re Agius1 
Will, 174 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (Sur. Ct. 1958). 
3. The testator9s use of different terms signifies 
different meanings. 
There is a strong presumption that when a testator uses 
different terms, "a different meaning must have been intended." 
Davisson v. Sparrow, 97 N.E.2d 694, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949). 
Thus, ff[i]f different words are employed with reference to a given 
subject matter, it will be assumed that the testator intended a 
different meaning when he employed such different expressions." 
Id. 
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B. The THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the Will Dispose of All 
of the Testator's Personal Property. 
The THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the Will are the main 
dispositive provisions of the Will. The SIXTH Article devises to 
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. "all articles of personal, household or 
domestic use or adornment," with certain exceptions. This language 
ostensibly relates to the Testator's personal effects and to the 
tangible personal property associated with his home. The only 
exceptions noted are those relating to the personal property 
associated with the Testator's business and the specific items of 
personal property distributed in kind under the THIRD Article of 
the Will. 
The THIRD Article of the Will begins with a clear and 
unmistakable expression of the Testator's intent to dispose of all 
of his personal property. That Article provides: 
All the rest, residue, and remainder of my 
estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever 
kind and nature and wheresoever the same may 
be situated of which I shall die seized or 
possess to which in any way I may be entitled 
at the time of my death [except the Horace S. 
Scarritt Trust], I give, devise, and bequeath 
as follows: . . . . 
The Testator then makes specific personal property devises in 
subsections A through E.l. of Article THIRD. Subsection E.2. then 
provides a mechanism for disposition of the "remaining items" of 
the Testator's "personal property:" 
The distribution of the remaining items of personal 
property should be determined by Curtiss S. 
Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park. 
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(Emphasis added.) The District Court concluded from a review of 
the entire will that this section created a valid power of 
appointment in the named individuals, to dispose of the residue of 
the Testator's personal property. [Order of Formal Probate, 
Conclusions, 5 11, R. 35.] This Court has held that no particular 
words are necessary to create a power of appointment, In re Estate 
of Lewis, 738 P.2d 617, 619-20 (Utah 1987), and Petitioner has not 
challenged the District Court's conclusion that Article THIRD, 
subsection E.2., created a valid power of appointment. 
The preamble to Article THIRD and the entirety of the Will 
demonstrate that the District Court reasonably concluded that the 
Testator intended the phrase "remaining items of personal property" 
as a residuary clause to pass all of the Testator's personal 
property residue. This construction is consistent with the broad 
definition of "personal property" provided by the Utah Code. 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code contains another provision which 
strongly supports the District Court's construction of the term 
"remaining items of personal property." Section 75-2-513 provides: 
[A] will may refer to a written statement of list 
to dispose of items of . . . personal property not 
otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, 
other than money, evidences of indebtedness, 
documents of title, and securities, and property 
used in trade or business. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-513 (1953). This provision includes within 
the term "items . . . of personal property," both "money" and its 
equivalents.11 The Testator's use of the term "remaining items of 
11Otherwise, this section would not have had to exclude those 
types of personal property from the scope of this provision. 
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personal property" should thus be construed as including all of the 
"remainder" (residue), of the Testator's "personal property," 
including the proceeds from the sale of his real property and any 
remaining "tangible personal property," as referenced in the 
SEVENTH Article of the Will. 
The statutory presumption against intestacy also requires the 
Court to give the "broadest meaning practicable" to the terms 
"personal property" and "remaining items of personal property,"12 
in order to avoid intestacy. Quick v. Owens. 198 S.C. 29, 15 
S.E.2d 837, 845 (1941); see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953); In 
re Estate of Gardner, 615 P. 2d at 1217. For example, in Barnes v. 
Evans, 102 N.C. App. 428, 402 S.E.2d 164 (N.C. 1991), aff'd. 
S.E.2d (N.C. 1992), the court construed the phrase "remaining 
cash and bonds" broadly to include "certificates of deposit." 402 
S.E.2d at 165-66. The court based its conclusion, in large part, 
on the strong presumption against intestacy, noting that "[i]t is 
not reasonable to infer that [the decedent] intended that almost 
one-half of her considerable estate—nearly one-half million 
dollars in value—be left adrift in the unchartered and uncertain 
seas of intestacy." Id. at 166. 
It is similarly unreasonable to infer that the Testator 
intended a substantial portion of his estate, an amount well over 
12The presumption against intestacy applies with particular 
force to the phrase "remaining items of personal property," because 
the Testator employed language resembling a residuary devise. See, 
e.g.. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 383 S.E.2d at 440; Estate of Rose, 
772 S.W.2d at 889. 
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a million dollars,13 to be "left adrift in the unchartered and 
uncertain seas of intestacy.If Id. For this reason, the provisions 
of the THIRD Article of his Will should be construed broadly to 
dispose of all of the "rest, residue, and remainder" of the 
Testator's personal property. 
1. Article SIXTH and Article THIRD, subsection E. 
cannot both be reasonably construed as devises of 
"personal effects." 
Petitioner contends, however, that the THIRD and SIXTH 
Articles of the Will do not dispose of all of the Testator's 
personal property. The Petitioner maintains that the SIXTH Article 
of the Will should be construed as referring exclusively to the 
Testator's "personal effects." [Appellant's Brief, at 2 0.] The 
Petitioner subsequently examines the THIRD Article of the Will, 
Subsection E., and asserts that the terms "personal property" and 
"remaining items of personal property" also refer exclusively to 
the Testator's "personal effects." Petitioner suggests that the 
location and language of Article THIRD, Subsection E., show that 
Subsection E does not "affect all remaining personal property." 
[Appellant's Brief, at 22-23.] These arguments should be rejected. 
a. Petitioner's narrow construction of the Will 
is inconsistent with the all-encompassing 
language of Article THIRD. 
The first paragraph of the THIRD Article of the Will expresses 
in clear and unmistakable terms the Testator's intent to dispose 
of all of his personal property. It is, therefore, incumbent upon 
It is anticipated that the sale of the Testator's real 
property alone will bring in over one million dollars. 
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the Court to effectuate that intent, if at all possible. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 75-2-603, 75-1-102 (1953); In re Estate of Wallich. 
420 P. 2d at 42. Petitioner's narrow construction of Article THIRD, 
Subsection E. as merely a "personal effects" provision contradicts 
the Testator's clear intent expressed at the beginning of the 
Article. The Personal Representative's construction of Article 
THIRD, Subsection E.2 is therefore more reasonable than the 
interpretation advanced by Petitioner. 
b. Petitioner's construction of Articles THIRD and 
SIXTH violates the presumption that different 
terms have different meanings. 
Petitioner's construction of Articles THIRD and SIXTH 
also violates the presumption that a testator's use of different 
terms signifies different intended meanings. In his Will, the 
Testator employed the following diverse terms in referring to his 
property: "real property" (SIXTH Article); "personal property" 
(Will, THIRD Article); "all articles of personal, household or 
domestic use or adornment" (Will, SIXTH Article); "tangible 
personal property" [Will, SIXTH Article]; and "remaining items of 
personal property" (Will, THIRD Article, Subsection E.2.). Because 
each of these terms is different, they must all be presumed to have 
different meanings. See Davisson, 97 N.E.2d at 695. 
The Petitioner suggests, contrary to this cannon of 
construction, that the Testator did not intend different meanings 
when he used these different terms. He argues that the terms 
"personal property" and "remaining items of personal property," as 
used in Article THIRD subsection E., and the term "all articles 
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of personal, household or domestic use or adornment," as used in 
Article SIXTH, must both be construed as referring to the 
Testator's "personal effects." The Petitioner also assigns the 
exact same meaning to the different words "items" and "articles" 
as used in the THIRD and SIXTH Articles, even though the word 
"items" is arguably more generic and broader in scope than the word 
"articles." Finally, the Petitioner's construction of the Will 
gives the terms "personal property" and "remaining items of 
personal property," as used in Subsection E, a more restrictive 
meaning than the term "tangible personal property." [Will, SEVENTH 
Article.] These significant interpretive inconsistencies in the 
Petitioner's argument demonstrate the flaws in the Petitioner's 
construction of the Will. 
The only reasonable construction of these different terms 
leads to the conclusion that the Testator intended to dispose of 
all of his personal property under the Will: 
The term "all articles of personal, household or domestic 
use or adornment" likely refers to the Testator's personal 
effects and, with the exceptions noted, the personal property 
associated with the Testator's home. 
The term "tangible personal property" refers to the 
Testator's non-monetary personal property. 
The term "personal property," being broader than the term 
"tangible personal property," must refer, without limitation, 
to all of the Testator's personal property "of whatsoever kind 
and nature and wheresoever the same may be situated . . . ." 
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[Will, THIRD Article.] It is important to note that before 
employing the term "personal property" in the THIRD Article 
of the Will, the Testator states that he is devising "All the 
rest, residue, and remainder of his estate, both real and 
personal, of whatsoever kind and nature . . . ." 
The term "remaining items of personal property," 
therefore, must be construed as referring to "all the rest, 
residue, and remainder" of Testator's "personal property," 
other than those items of personal property specifically 
devised in subsections A through E.I., of Article THIRD, and 
the personal effects, which are disposed of in Article SIXTH. 
Under these appropriate definitions, the dispositive 
provisions of the Will are sufficiently broad to dispose of all of 
the Testator's personal property. 
To the extent that the Petitioner has created any ambiguity 
or uncertainty in the terms used in Articles THIRD, SIXTH, and 
SEVENTH of the Will, Utah law provides two means of resolving the 
dispute. First, the statutory presumption against intestacy 
requires the Court to adopt the Personal Representative's 
"reasonable construction" of the Articles THIRD and SIXTH, which 
leads to testacy, over the Petitioner's construction of those 
provisions, which would result in intestacy as to the bulk of 
Testator's estate. In re Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d at 1217; see 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-604 (1953). 
Second, to the extent that the terms "personal property," 
"remaining items of personal property," and "all articles of 
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personal, household and domestic use and adornment" are ambiguous, 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the Testator's intent. 
See Estate of Ashton, 804 P.2d at 542-43; Godfrey. 811 P.2d at 
1251. The extrinsic evidence in this case establishes that the 
Testator intended Article THIRD, Subsection E.2., to pass all of 
the Testator's personal property residue. [Affidavit of James M. 
Park J 12, R. 86.] 
2. Article SEVENTH does not recognize that personal 
property would be left in the estate. 
Petition also argues that the SEVENTH Article of the Will 
recognizes the limited scope of Article THIRD. Petitioner suggests 
that the District Court improperly construed the Testator's 
instruction to sell any "tangible personal property and livestock 
included in my estate and not effectively disposed of pursuant to 
Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof" as a "boilerplate catch-all 
phrase." These arguments should be rejected. 
a. Article SEVENTH merely recognizes that some 
articles of "tangible personal property" may 
not be distributed in kind. 
The District Court properly concluded that the language of the 
SEVENTH Article does not indicate that the Testator intended to die 
partially intestate. In light of the strong presumption against 
intestacy and the Testator's other clear indications of his intent, 
a reasonable construction of the language quoted by Petitioner is 
that the Testator intended the Personal Representative to sell any 
miscellaneous items of "tangible personal property" that were not 
distributed in kind under the Will. Those proceeds were then to 
be "added to [the] estate" for use and distribution as money. This 
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construction draws additional support from the fact that the 
SEVENTH Article also references the sale of "livestock • . . not 
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH," when 
the Testator knew that Article THIRD, Subsections C. and D. had 
already disposed of "all race horse related livestock" and "all 
other livestock and saddle horses • . . ." The District Court, 
therefore, properly viewed the provision in question as somewhat 
of a "boilerplate catch-all phrase." 
In the case of Kuiken v. Simonds. 3 N.J, 480, 70 A.2d 740 
(1949), the court faced a similar textual difficulty in a will. 
The will directed the testator's executors to sell all of his real 
property, while a subsequent phrase directed the executors "to 
divide all my then remaining estate both real and personal." 70 
A. 2d at 743 (italics in original). The court recognized that no 
real property would remain in the estate after the executors1 sale 
and simply ignored the later reference as inconsistent with the 
testator's obvious intent. Id. 
Similarly, even if the language and placement of Articles 
THIRD, SIXTH, and SEVENTH in the Testator's Will provides some 
interpretive difficulty, this Court should effectuate the 
Testator's obvious intent that his real property and remaining 
"tangible personal property" be sold and that proceeds be added to 
his estate for use and distribution under the Will. As the 
District Court aptly stated "[Any] technical problems [in the Will] 
should not be applied in such a hypercritical fashion as to defeat 
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the obvious intent of the testator." [Order of Formal Probate, 
Conclusions, 5 7, R. 34.] 
b. The provisions of the Will should not be 
applied rigidly, in derogation of Testator's 
clear intent to dispose of all property. 
The provisions of the Will should not be construed rigidly, 
one after another, without regard to the Testator's overall intent 
and plan of distribution. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 (1953); 
In re Estate of Wallich, 420 P.2d at 42. The fact that the sale 
of the Ranch, together with any "tangible personal property" not 
distributed in kind under Article THIRD, might not occur until 
after the Personal Representative's initial distributions under 
Articles THIRD and SIXTH does not indicate that the Testator 
intended the residue of his personal property to pass in intestacy. 
It simply means that the provisions of the Will must be construed 
together and applied flexibly to effectuate the Testator's intent 
that his real property and remaining "tangible personal property" 
be sold and that the proceeds of sale be "added to" his estate for 
use distribution under the Will. It would be a perfectly 
reasonable construction of the Will for the Personal Representative 
to make distributions of personal property in kind, as directed in 
paragraphs THIRD and SIXTH; to sell the Ranch and any remaining 
"tangible personal property;" and then to distribute the sale 
proceeds as a "remaining item[] of personal property." 
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3. The manner of disposition of Article THIRD, 
Subsection E.2. is completely consistent with 
disposition of the residue of Testator's estate. 
Petitioner argues lastly, that the power of appointment 
granted to the Personal Representative, to James M. Park, and to 
the Testator's son, regarding the "remaining items of personal 
property," [Will, Article THIRD, Subsection E.2.], is inconsistent 
with an intent to dispose of anything of any real value. 
Petitioner suggests that this provision provides a manner of 
distribution which "resembles a common method of disposing of 
miscellaneous personal effects, divided up as close friends may 
agree. [Appellant's Brief, at 24.] 
Petitioner's construction of this provision should be rejected 
because more a reasonable view of this provision is available and 
will avoid intestacy. If Article THIRD, Subsection E.2., was 
intended as nothing more than a bequest of miscellaneous "personal 
effects," the Testator would not have thought it sufficiently 
important to include on the committee the Personal Representative; 
his attorney, James M. Park; and his son, Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. 
A request to the Personal Representative would have been more than 
sufficient. The District Court also found it "significant that 
the testator included in this committee two of his close personal 
friends and his son Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.," Order of Formal 
Probate, Findings, I 14, R. 31-32, indicating that the scope of 
this provision is much greater than Petitioner suggests. 
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C. Alternatively, the Court Could Reasonably Conclude that 
the Testatorfs Personal Property Residue Passed under 
Article SIXTH of the Will, 
Alternatively, if this Court were to conclude that the only 
reasonable interpretation of the term "personal property," as used 
in Article THIRD, subsection E. of the Will, referred to the 
Testator's "personal effects," the phrase "all articles of 
personal, household, and domestic use or adornment," as used in 
Article SIXTH, should be construed more broadly. While this phrase 
ostensibly refers to the Testator's personal effects and the 
property associated with his home, the Testator made the effort to 
exclude, among other things, the personal property associated with 
his ranching business. These exclusions suggest a broader 
construction of the phrase "articles of personal, household and 
domestic use" than "personal effects," This bequest also follows 
the bequests made in Article THIRD, suggesting that the Testator 
was disposing of all other personal property that remained. The 
Testator also made certain to except out of this devise the 
personal property "selected and distributed" pursuant to Article 
THIRD. 
In In re Scheiner's Will, 215 Iowa 1101, 247 N.W. 532 (Iowa 
1933), the court construed the similar phrase, "[a]ll my household 
and personal property." The court concluded that the testator did 
not intend to die intestate and that the phrase would be construed 
to include all of the testator's personal property. 247 N.W. at 
533-34. It would, therefore, be a reasonable construction of the 
Will that the Testator's personal property residue passed under 
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Article SIXTH of the Will. This construction would likewise be 
consistent with the Testator's unmistakable intent to pass all of 
his property under the Will and the statutory presumption against 
intestacy. 
In light of the Testator's clear intent to dispose of all of 
his personal property, as established by the language of the will, 
the definitions provided by the Utah Code, the strong presumption 
against intestacy, and the Testator's use of different terms to 
describe various types of personal property, the Petitioner's claim 
that the Testator died partially intestate as to his personal 
property should be rejected. 
POINT V 
THE TESTATOR DID NOT INTEND TO PASS A 
MAJORITY OF HIS ESTATE BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION. 
Finally, the NINTH Article of the Will clearly manifests the 
Testator's intent with respect to the Petitioner: 
I make no provision for my son, Ryan Winthrop 
Scarritt, for the reason that he will be well-
provided for, following my death, under the 
will of my father, Horace S. Scarritt. 
The Testator included this provision in the Will, knowing that 
Petitioner would share in trust properties amounting to several 
million dollars. [Will, Article THIRD; Hearing Transcript, p. 27.] 
The NINTH Article, therefore, clearly reveals the Testator's intent 
that the Petitioner receive none of the Testator's property, 
whether real or personal. It also explains the Testator's reasons 
for omitting Petitioner from the Will. 
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Since the Testator is presumed to know the law of intestate 
succession, see, e.g. , Wallich v. Wallich. 10 Utah 2d 192, 350 P. 2d 
614, 616 (1960), which would grant half of any intestate assets to 
the Petitioner, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-103 (1) (a) (1953), the 
Petitioner's claim that the Testator intended to die intestate as 
to almost his entire estate is completely inconsistent with the 
Testator's intent as clearly expressed in the NINTH Article of the 
Will. The District Court aptly concluded: 
The testator in paragraph NINTH of the 
Will stated his express intent to make no 
provision for his son Ryan W. Scarritt for the 
reason that Ryan was or would be well provided 
for under the Will of Horace S. Scarritt. 
That intent is crystal clear, and were the 
Court to find that Mr. Scarritt intended to 
die intestate, it would be in direct 
contravention of the express provisions of 
paragraph NINTH of the Will. 
[Order of Formal Probate, Findings, J 10, R. 31.] 
CONCLUSION 
For all of these reasons, the Personal Representative 
respectfully requests that the order of the District Court be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^"~ day of April, 1992. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
^Ai.^. 
Michael M0\Lat&f, Esq. 
Gregory M. ftess^ Esq. 
Attorneys for Rodney K. Orton, 
Personal Representative/ 
Appellee 
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postage pre-paid, properly addressed to: 
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St. George, UT 84771-0400 
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ADDENDUM 
Affidavit of James M. Park in Opposition to the 
Petition of Ryan W. Scarritt [R. 83-97•] 
Michael M. Later (3728) 
Gregory M. Hess (5611) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801)532-7840 
Michael w. Park (2516) 
THE PARK FIRM 
2 West St. George Boulevard 
Ancestor Square Towers Bldg., Suite 32 
P.O. Box 2438 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Telephone: (801) 673-8689 
Attorneys for Rodney K. Orton, in his 
capacity as Personal Representative 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
CURTI-i S. SCARRITT, 
Deceased. 
ESTATE OF 
) AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. PARK 
) IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION 
) OF RYAN W. SCARRITT 
i Probate No. 913500084 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
James M. Park, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. I was admitted to the practice of law on May 11, 
1989, and am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar, 
2. I drafted the Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. 
Scarritt (the "Will"), which is the subject of the "Petition for 
Formal Probate of Will, Construction of Will, Declaration of 
Partial Intestacy, and Supervised Administration" filed herein by 
Ryan W. Scarritt on or about July 12, 1991 (the "Petition"). 
3. Prior to drafting the Will, I discussed with Curtiss 
S. Scarritt the manner in which he desired to dispose of his 
estate. 
4. During our discussions, Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly 
stated that he intended all of his property, whether real or 
personal, and wherever situated, to pass under his will and not by 
way of intestate succession. 
5. Curtiss S. Scarritt also clearly expressed his intent 
that the real property he owned in Virgin, Utah (the "Ranch 
Property") be sold, that the proceeds thereof be added to his 
estate for use in paying his debts, the estate taxes, and the 
expenses of administration, and that the remaining proceeds be 
distributed in accordance with his will. He emphatically stated 
that under no condition did he want the Ranch Property itself to 
pass into the hands of either of his sons, Curtiss S. Scarritt, 
Jr., or Ryan W. Scarritt. 
6. Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly expressed his intent 
that, with the exception of several specific articles, his personal 
effects and the personal property associated with his home should 
be devised to his son, Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. 
7. Curtiss S. Scarritt further expressed his intent that 
the residue of his personal property, of whatever kind or nature, 
including the remaining proceeds from the sale of the Ranch 
Property, be left in the power of Rodney K. Orton, Curtiss S. 
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Scarritt, Jr., and myself largely for distribution to Curtiss S. 
Scarritt, Jr., after the payment of the debts, estate taxes, and 
expenses of administration. 
8. Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly stated his intent that 
none of his property, of whatever kind or nature, or wherever 
situated, pass to his ex-wife, Donna L. Scarritt, or to his son, 
Ryan W. Scarritt. 
9. After completing my discussions with Curtiss S. 
Scarritt, I drafted the Will. Curtiss S. Scarritt and I met 
subsequently to review its various provisions. 
10. During our review of the THIRD Section of the Will, 
Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly expressed his intent and understanding 
that the phrase "the remaining items of personal property" as used 
in subsection E.2. meant and included "(a)ll the rest, residue, and 
remainder" of his personal property, of "whatsoever kind and nature 
and wheresoever the same may be situated, " other than the personal 
property he devised in other provisions of the Will and the 
property associated with the Horace S. Scarritt Trust. In short, 
Curtiss S. Scarritt intended and understood subsection E.2. to be 
a residual personal property clause. 
11. During our review of the SIXTH Section of the Will, 
Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly expressed his intent and understanding 
that the language "all articles of personal, household or domestic 
use or adornment, which may be included in my Utah estate at my 
death," excepting the personal property associated with his ranch 
business, and the personal property specifically devised under the 
3 
THIRD Section of the Will, meant and included essentially all of 
his personal, effects and the other articles of personal property 
associated with his home. 
12. During our review of the SEVENTH Section of the Will, 
Curtiss S. Scarritt clearly expressed his intent and understanding 
that the language used therein required his personal representative 
to sell the Ranch Property and to add the proceeds of the sale to 
his estate for use in paying his debts, the estate taxes, and the 
expenses of administration. He also clearly expressed his intent 
and understanding that the remaining proceeds of the sale of the 
Ranch Property would be one of "the remaining items of personal 
property" that would be distributed in accordance with subsection 
E.2. of the THIRD Section of the Will. 
13. Curtiss S. Scarritt further expressed his intent and 
understanding that the language "until such time as the ranch is 
sold or for a period of time which shall be 1 .ft to the sole 
discretion of my personal representative: and "at such time or 
times and upon such terms and conditions as shall seem advisable, " 
as used in the SEVENTH Section of the Will, meant only that the 
timing, terms, and conditions of the sale of the Ranch Property 
would be left to the discretion of his personal representative, not 
that the sale of the Ranch Property itself would be discretionary. 
14. At the completion of our review of the Will, Curtiss 
S. Scarritt expressed his intent and understanding that the Will 
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disposed or all of his property, of whatever kind or nature, and 
wherever situated, and that none of his property would pass by way 
of intestate succession. 
DATED this / ? #
 d a y o f August, 1991. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /^J/> day of 
August^^ijg,^.....^^,^^ .„ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Cedar City, Utah 
w^^ &*jhm i 
My Commission Expires: 
June 8, 1993 
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